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Within the EU economy, the Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) 
sector was worth €614bn in 20051 of which, the electronic communications market 
accounted for 44.4%.  This market, underpins the whole EU economy2 as showed by 
the fact that ICT accounted for 40% of European productivity growth in 2005 (25% of 
overall growth)3.  The EU’s approach to electronic communications must therefore be 
viewed within its overall approach to ICT, based on the Lisbon agenda of 2000 and 
reinforced by the i2010 initiative4.  The latter sees a key EU challenge as the creation 
of a single information space with an internal market which is open and competitive.  
It stresses the importance of ICT in achieving the economic growth and employment 
objectives of the former that are required if the EU is to meet the challenges of a 21st 
century information based, globalised economy.   
 
To help achieve these aims the regulatory framework introduced in 2002 for 
electronic communications networks and services (the Framework) sought to 
harmonise regulatory procedures and principles.  It is based on an idea of light touch 
ex ante regulation that will evolve as the market develops into a system based on 
competition law principles.  The past year has seen an extensive review and public 
consultation by the European Commission regarding the Framework, the challenge of 
which has been to ensure the Framework is suitable for the next 10 years.  Although 
legally required5, at a time of rapid convergence the review would have been needed 
to ensure that the overall aims of the EU were not hindered by overlapping regulations 
stifling industry innovation and growth.  This work critically assesses the Framework 
by establishing its success and failure in terms of the following key objectives6: 
  
1) Increased investment in the market 
2) Promoting Competition 
3) Promoting the interests of EU citizens, and 
4) Contributing to the development of the internal market 
 
The proposed changes will be discussed at each point to assess their likely impact. It 
will be argued that while there has been successes the failure to ensure effective 
                                                          
*University of Hertfordshire  
1  European Commission Communication European Electronic Communications Regulations and 
Markets 2005 (11th Report) COMM (2006) 68 final 
2 According to the Commission Communication ‘Working Together For Growth and Jobs.  A New 
Start for the Lisbon Strategy’ COMM (2005) 24 02/02/2005 
3 Supra note 1 
4 COMM (2005) 229 
5 Article 25 Framework Directive 
6 As stated in article 8 of the Framework Directive.  Point 1 is mentioned in article 8 as a means of 
promoting competition but is discussed separately as it is part of the overall EU economic objectives 
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implementation of the Framework means even with the proposed changes a 
Framework of pure competition principles remains some way off. 
 
1) The Impact on Investment 
 
Prior to the Framework, there had been a decline in market investment.  In a study by 
London Economics 7 , 12% of companies and trade associations surveyed cited 
regulation uncertainty as a main reason for this.  The EU hoped the Framework would 
provide certainty, leading to higher market investment, which in turn would add 
growth.  The issue is therefore, whether the Framework has been conducive to 
increased investment and has that investment taken place.  Increased investment has 
occurred but whether this is due to the Framework is unclear and varies between 
different players in the market.  Since 2003 aggregate investment levels have rose 
year on year to a level in 2005 of €45bn8.  23% of respondents stated regulatory 
factors as their main reason9.  The highest reason given was 43% for new market 
opportunities.  At the time the Framework came into force the EU was about to admit 
10 new states.  Therefore, it could be argued that the Framework contributed to these 
opportunities by providing regulatory certainty over a wider area. 
 
Specific questions were also asked regarding the Framework and investment.  In all 
sub-sectors of the wholesale and retail electronic communications markets, the 
majority opinion was that the Framework improves incentives to invest10.  Yet, the 
most agreed with statement was that “The regulatory framework deters investment in 
new technological developments”.  The reasoning for this paradox could lie in who 
made up the sample.  The Commission has noted11 that when viewed relatively to 
revenues, investment is predominantly from new entrants, while incumbents have felt 
the framework has ‘hindered new investment’.  Further, “Uncertainty about the terms 
of access discourages the entry of new companies into e-communications” was 
disagreed with, lending weight to the suggestion that more incumbents were surveyed 
and they feel new players have entered the market driving overall investment but 
deterring them from investing.  If this is the case, the question is why.  Potentially, 
they may not want to outlay capital until they know the competition’s strategy or may 
be unwilling to invest and then have the new entrants share the fruits of that 
investment through increased knowledge or shared access. Alternatively, they may 
have already made significant investments prior to the Framework in anticipation of 
technological advances or competition.  This can be seen with Deutsche Telekom who 
invested heavily in new technologies in 2002 at a time when the overall market 
investment was in decline due to the stage of the economic cycle and the dot.com 
bubble bursting.   
 
                                                          
7  In association with PricewaterhouseCooper ‘An Assessment of the Regulatory Framework For 
Electronic Communications – Growth and Investment in the EU e-Communications Sector’ 
8 Taken from a speech by Viviane Reding at the Annual Meeting of BITKOM 27th June 2006 
9 They believe regulatory certainty, made up of clear legislation with comprehensive guidance and a 
timely implementation procedure is one of the main factors in choosing to invest.  Better performing 
regulatory regimes have also been shown to contribute to higher investment levels by the OECD. 
10 Table 4.7 at p110 of the study 
11  European Commission Communication on the Review of the EU Regulatory Framework for 
Electronic Communications Networks and Services COM (2006) 334 final 
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No specific investment reforms have been proposed.  However, some respondents 
suggested raising its profile by having an objective of sustainable investment on a par 
with promoting competition.  This would at least make National Regulatory 
Authorities (NRAs) more focused in that their actions must actually achieve 
investment rather than merely encourage it.  Although, it could be questioned whether 
it matters if the Framework actually encourages investment as technological necessity 
means investment will take place, as stated by some of the respondents.  Perhaps all 
we should expect is a system that ensures a level playing field for participants, which 
is certain in nature.   
 
Comments regarding investment post-Framework introduction should be cautioned 
with the fact there was a downtrend prior to this primarily due to the global economic 
situation.  Ultimately though, the Framework must be said to have been fairly 
effective in encouraging investment in the market especially from new entrants.  Yet 
inefficient implementation has offset pan-European investment by leaving a level of 
uncertainty amongst market players12.  If the Framework had been more consistently 
implemented, investment would be higher13.  A comparison of UK and Germany 
(who have contrasting levels of effective implementation) shows that market 
investment is 0.42% and 0.27% of GDP respectively14.   As the statement “In order to 
encourage more network investment, fundamental changes should be made to the 
regulatory framework within the next 2 years” was also disagreed with it appears the 
Framework does have the support of the market to drive investment. 
 
2) Promoting Competition 
 
Market competition, particularly retail has increased15.  This is illustrated by figures 
showing that for those states with published figures, the market share of the leading 
mobile phone operator fell in 19 states and the EU average is 43% (down 6%)16.  
Mergers and acquisitions reached their highest levels for 5 years in 2005 at €70bn17 
and The Financial Times has reported how private equity firms are showing a 
growing appetite for telecoms companies 18 . However, competition is far from 
consistent across Member States and there is a clear difference between those who 
have effectively implemented the Framework and those who have not.  The UK, 
which has the highest score for effectiveness of implementation, 19  has the most 
diversified mobile market in Europe20 with a subscriber market share of 2,267 per 
operator.  Germany (15th highest score), has a more concentrated market with 3,081 
market share per operator. 
 
                                                          
12 As noted in the study at p114. 
13 A report by SPC Network Ltd ‘European Telecommunications Lost Investment: An Analysis of the 
ECTA Scorecard’ indicates that if all member states had an effective implementation score of 100% 
investment would increase by 13.1 billion euros (31.7%).  
14 Supra note 8, Germany has been chosen to minimise the influence of general economic factors as 
both have a similar overall GDP and market demographic 
15 The EU proposes to remove 7 retail markets from its Recommendation on Relevant Markets 
16 www.epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu  
17 Supra note 1 
18 24/11/06  discussing the 1.19bn purchase of Ceske Radiokomunikace by a private equity group 
19 ECTA Regulatory Scorecard 2006 
20 Using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of market concentration, as reported in a research paper by 
Ofcom ‘The International Communications Market 2006’ published Nov 2006  
Hertfordshire Law Journal 5(1), 78-85   
ISSN 1479-4195 Online / ISSN 1479-4209 CDRom 
 
© Neal Geach  
The moral rights of the author have been asserted.  
Database rights The Centre for International Law (maker).  
 
81
However, it is also worth noting that even in States that have appeared to liberalise 
their domestic market, there is still insufficient competition.  In Slovenia the number 
of mobile phone operators has increased to six, comparing favourably with the UK.  
Yet this hides the fact that within the last year, two operators have been sold to the 
same company with the heads of both, citing the government’s failure to open the 
market to competition.  The entire telecommunications market is dominated by 
Telekom Slovenije, which is 75% controlled by the government, meaning the 
regulator is the main shareholder21. Both said they had to fight to get the access to 
Telekom Slovenije’s infrastructure guaranteed under the Framework. Slovenia is 
perhaps a prime example of domestic conditions impacting on the Framework.  With 
the public against foreign ownership and an election looming the government has 
been keen to stress how well the economy has performing without further 
liberalisation22 and market competition. 
 
Therefore, competition has increased where the Framework is implemented 
effectively however, the data also suggests competition has occurred even where 
implementation has been ineffective or in the case of Greece, non-existent23.  The 
question is whether the increase has arisen not through the Framework being in place, 
but due to wider economic factors.  This could be true when comparing economically 
unequal states but carries less weight for states that are more equal in economic size 
but have different records in their implementation of the Framework.  As noted 
previously, the mobile phone market is more competitive in the UK and this is also 
the case in terms of the broadband market.  In Germany, the leading three operators 
account for 76.1% of retail subscriptions, in the UK it is 55.1%24.    
 
3) Promoting the interests of EU citizens 
 
Technological advances are driving penetration in broadband and VoIP 25 , and 
increase date rates.  Substitution and convergence between fixed and mobile 
telephony networks will raise number portability issues along with broadband 
migration codes26.  To ensure a digital divide does not spread, the EU proposes to 
look at the area of universal service obligations in a separate review in 2007.  
Therefore, this work concentrates on whether citizen’s interests have been promoted 
through security and network integrity provisions; as without consumer confidence 
and buy-in the Framework falters. 
 
By the Commission’s own admission27 there is a growing security threat, ‘partly due 
to the lack of appropriate security measures’28.  This is heightened by Member States 
                                                          
21 Plans have been announced to sell 50%, Financial Times Special Report: Slovenia 13/12/2006 
22 The economy has outperformed many in the Eurozone and has enabled Slovenia to join the Euro 
whereas countries such as Lithuania have missed out due to inflation caused by investment in more 
liberalised markets.  Discussed  in the Financial Times Special Report  
23 The necessary legislation has only been enacted during 2006; the share of fixed telephony calls by 
alternate providers increased 5.1% in the first six months of 2005, compared to 2004.  Taken from the 
EU 2006 Report on the National Reform Program Implementation for Greece. 
24 ‘The International Communications Market 2006’ published by Ofcom in Nov 2006  
25 Voice over Internet Protocol – telephone calls made using the infrastructure of the Internet  
26 Currently switching broadband suppliers is seen as arduous.  Though from February in the UK these 
codes will fall under the general authorisation conditions but not where the supplier uses their own 
telecoms network following Local Loop Unbundling. 
27 Supra note 11 
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differing in their application of the obligation for providers of publicly available 
electronic communications services, to take measures to safeguard their services’ 
security29.  This issue grows in importance as pan-European services develop.  It has 
now been proposed to impose specific requirements on providers to ‘implement and 
maintain security measures to address security incidents and to prevent or minimise 
the impact of such incidents on customers’.  They would also have to respect NRA 
guidance and have ‘liability clauses for not taking the appropriate security 
measures’30.  This would also be supported by a measure requiring security breaches 
to be reported as well as risks.  To emphasize the increased importance if the issue a 
new chapter will be wrote into the Framework Directive.   
 
Arguably, the fact that this is not the current situation was a massive oversight when 
the Framework drafted.  This will force operators to invest in security and make them 
accountable to their consumers.  It is concerning though, that states such as Sweden 
have only given the proposals a cautious welcome.  However, if the measures are to 
be ultimately successful then the EU needs to work globally to combat the problems 
such as spam which do not respect national borders.  
 
4) Contributing to the development of the internal market 
 
Viviane Reding has acknowledged that the internal market is currently 
fragmentised31.  A study by Hogan and Hartson LLP32 (the Study), has stated that 
those surveyed feel ‘implementation needs to be completed, and in some cases 
improved’.  Without the Framework being implemented and applied in a uniform 
manner an internal market cannot be fully functional.     
 
The biggest factor affecting implementation of the Framework appears to be an 
unwillingness to do so by Member States33, perhaps due to domestic political and 
economic reasons.  For example in Germany, a law was passed in December 
protecting a €3bn investment in ultra fast internet lines by the incumbent Deutsche 
Telekom34; of which 14.62% is state owned35.  Further, as noted, Slovenian public 
opposition is thought to be delaying plans to privatise the incumbent operator until 
after the next election. 
 
Due to delays, in some instances the first round of post market analysis notifications 
to the Commission may well be incomplete while some states move on to a second 
round.  A related issue is delay caused by the time taken to complete the market 
                                                                                                                                                                      
28 The issue is not just applicable to the internet, as the recent Greek Vodafone bugging scandal 
illustrates. 
29 Article 4 e-Privacy Directive 
30  Staff Working Document on the Review of the EU Regulatory Framework for Electronic 
Communications Networks and Services - Proposed Changes SEC (2006) 816 
31 Speaking at the ECTA Annual Conference in Brussels 16/11/2006 
32 With Analysys Consulting Ltd ‘Preparing the next steps in regulation of electronic communications - 
A contribution to the review of the electronic communications regulatory framework’  
33 The Framework was not transposed into national law by the required deadline in 7 Member States.  
In total the Commission has initiated 90 infringement proceedings against all 25 Member States due to 
incorrect implementation. 
34 Reported on  MSNBC 16/12/2006 at www.msnbc.msm.com/id/16229648/  
35 During the review, Germany led calls for the introduction of a regulatory holiday for incumbents to 
allow them to invest in emerging markets.   
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analysis process (regardless of when it is started) which has been said to be ‘onerous 
and pose problems for NRAs, particularly for smaller NRAs’ by the European 
Regulators Group36 (ERG).  This is a problem as a drawn out process diverts NRA 
resources from enforcement and creates a level of uncertainty amongst undertakings 
looking to enter a market, not forgetting that the technologies in question are changing 
rapidly.  The Study suggests that the process will only get more burdensome.  Firstly, 
as incumbent’s market share decrease, it will be harder to establish Significant Market 
Power.  Additionally, as technologies converge further and new platforms take hold, 
the process of defining markets will be more complex and existing markets may need 
redefining.  Lastly, through the possibility of increased litigation as incumbents strive 
to maintain market share and revenues.  Although they note the possibility that it may 
speed up as NRAs are more experienced and there is a more expansive body of work 
to refer to.  Although, it must be said the former view would seem the more likely. 
However, the Commission’s proposals may well be impracticable in some cases, 
while others not actually achieve their purpose37.  One proposal is to rationalise the 
process into a new Regulation, with the market analysis to start within 12 months of 
domestic implementation and be completed within a further 12 months.  Sweden has 
called this unrealistic, while the UK questions whether it will improve the quality of 
analyses38.  A solution may be to let NRAs set their on timeframe for their overall 
process with explanations and submit this for Commission approval39.  This way 
flexibility is maintained by allowing domestic factors and complexities to be taken 
into account while not allowing the process to be open-ended.   
 
Another obstacle to the internal market is a lack of harmonised remedies following 
the market analysis review.  The Commission has noted40 that ‘NRAs have applied 
similar sets of remedies to similar market failures.  However, the detail and 
implementation of those remedies have differed considerably’.  This may prevent 
operators moving into different state markets as they may be unsure how the 
Framework will be applied impacting competition.  The Commission proposes to 
extend its veto powers to cover proposed remedies on the basis this ‘would contribute 
to a consistent approach’41.  It is questionable what this would achieve without a right 
to impose its own remedy as NRAs must currently take into account the 
Commission’s comments.  The Study notes it will more likely increase delays as 
NRAs spend longer drawing up justifications for their remedy and potentially have to 
start again if it is vetoed.  Further, as in the view of the UK it ignores the fact that 
NRAs have more knowledge and understanding of local market conditions.  
Strengthening cooperation by NRAs, perhaps through the ERG42, may be the best 
course of action. 
 
                                                          
36 European Regulators Group and Independent Regulators Group Response to Call For Input on the 
forthcoming review of the EU regulatory Framework for electronic communications and services. 
37 A further proposal to reduce the detail needed on certain notifications still requires the NRA to carry 
out a full analysis and consultation therefore having negligible impact on NRA workloads. 
38 In their respective responses to the Commission Communication on the Review of the Regulatory 
Framework for Electronic Communications Networks and Services COM (2006) 334 final 
39 This analysis is also shared by the Hogan and Hartson study 
40  Communication on Market Reviews under the EU Regulatory Framework ‘Consolidating the 
internal market for electronic communications’ COMM (2006) 28 final 
41 Supra note 29 
42 Although care should be taken to ensure that the ERG does not duplicate the Commission. 
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An additional problem impacting the internal market is that operators’ individual 
rights of use have conditions that vary between states.  The Commission recommends 
a common approach to the authorisation of pan-European services.  This is logical as 
the point of the internal market is to stimulate cross border activity.  The proposal is 
that where a service has a pan-European scope or internal market relevance, an 
authorisation in one Member State will be valid throughout the EU with no change in 
conditions.  This would reduce the burden on NRAs by allowing them to concentrate 
on enforcement and on operators who do not have to continually obtain 
authorisations.  The proposal is vague on specifics leading to doubts from the UK, 
Sweden and Holland as to how it will work in practice although not dismissing it in 
principle.  It is suggested, using the Study as a guide as to how it could be 
implemented, this idea should be looked into as if national market differences could 
be overcome (for example leaving NRAs some scope to impose conditions), it would 
aid a more harmonised internal market. 
 
To aid the internal market, legal certainty is needed as to what the grounds are for an 
appeal against a NRA decision in a Member State, and what the situation will be 
while that appeal is underway.  The technological nature of the market also dictates 
that speed is of essence.  Under the Framework as it stands, discrepancies between 
different states appeal process have occurred. The Study notes that, some states treat 
appeals as part of their administrative court process, while others have specialist ad 
hoc bodies.  This potentially causes a discrepancy between the expertises available.  
An issue therefore, is whether the Framework should create a specific supranational 
body to hear appeals.  The Study argues the added regulatory controls this would 
entail are probably not justified on two grounds.  Firstly, decisions will primarily be 
based on local facts which will be better appreciated by a domestic body.  Secondly, 
the purpose of the Framework is to move to regulation by competition principles.  
Therefore, long term these specialist courts are not needed.  A set time period43 and 
certainty as to the position in the interim period would be more beneficial.  The Study 
proposes introducing set criteria that must be satisfied for a NRA decision to be 
suspended pending an appeal44; this has been accepted by the Commission.  While the 
UK’s Response calls this as ‘an encroachment on national competence for the 
operation of national legal systems’ it is a welcome change and should have been in 
the Framework from its conception.  No proposals have been made to set an appeals 
timeframe but if the timeframe for the analysis process is shortened then this may be 
reduced as an issue.  The proposal instead, is to monitor appeal numbers and length 
through states reporting to the Commission, leaving the possibility of future reform. 
 
Despite the deficiencies, positive points can be taken from the current situation.  As 
noted cross border mergers and acquisitions have increased and operators have moved 
into new national markets45.  Therefore, while improvement is undoubtedly needed, 
access into national markets, helping to create an EU wide market, has increased.  
 
Conclusions 
 
                                                          
43 According to ECTA some appeals have taken up to 3 years.   
44 Amending Article 4 of the Framework Directive 
45 For example Telefonica O2 (created from a Spanish and British firm) have just recently moved into 
the Slovakian mobile market 
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Ineffective implementation arises repeatedly when viewing the Framework, offsetting 
any successes as the internal market is fragmented.  Therefore, the hope of a regime 
based on pure competition principles is still some way off. The EU feels an 
independent European Regulator would ensure consistent application.  NRAs would 
still analyse domestic markets and act as contact points but would work within 
guidelines and decisions of the new body.  Independence is needed in the system to 
ensure the Framework is not compromised by national interests but this creates 
another regulatory layer which may not appreciate differences in national markets 
leading to a stifling of competition by imposing a one size fits all approach.  Tougher 
penalties for states as well as governments would arguably be more effective.  The 
key reforms are facilitating access to spectrum resources for market players with a 
coordinated management decision making mechanism and functional separation of 
incumbents.  However, experience of the Framework shows the latter is more likely to 
succeed.  A final issue is whether a delayed competition regime matters.  With so 
many prevalent public policy issues, such as universal service, it is questionable 
whether market forces can be trusted to cater for the needs of everybody and ensure 
there is no European digital divide. 
 
